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ABSTRACT In this paper, the concept and recent development of exploiting frequency diverse array 
(FDA) and its variants for the physical-layer wireless security have been revisited and carefully examined. 
Following rigorous analytical derivation and illustrative simulations, the authors realize that the 
investigations performed in some recent works overlooked one critical issue facing the real-world 
applications, and system models established and used before were based on a limited assumption, i.e. that 
the legitimate and eavesdropping users at different ranges sample the signal waveforms at the same time 
instant. The limitation of this assumption results in their studies inconclusive. The authors aim to take the 
first step to divert research efforts and rectify the previous incomplete analyses. The authors argue that in 
the current technology base the FDA cannot secure a free-space wireless transmission in range domain, 
because the previously claimed ‘secure reception region’ propagates in range domain as time elapses. 
INDEX TERMS Directional modulation, frequency diverse array (FDA), physical-layer wireless security, 
radiation patterns 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Directional Modulation (DM) is a type of keyless physical-
layer wireless security technique, which, in its original form, 
is able to transmit desired signal waveforms with information 
modulated only along pre-selected directions, while 
distorting the waveforms along all other spatial directions in 
free space [1]–[4]. In this fashion the information transmitted 
wirelessly in free space can only be reliably recovered by 
legitimate receivers positioned along those selected 
directions, enhancing security directly at physical layer. The 
technique is very attractive for security applications of 
modern radio systems, as it does not require mathematically 
generated cryptographic keys and supports a very simple 
receiver’s architecture. However, the biggest issue for real-
life applications is its inability to provide security in range-
domain when line-of-sight (LoS) communication links are 
concerned, i.e. any eavesdropper located at the same 
direction as the legitimate receiver is able to intercept the 
secret information. 
Recent theoretical works in [5]–[17] attempted to solve 
this problem. The proposed solutions combine DM with a 
Frequency Diverse Array (FDA) – a technique used in radar 
systems to illuminate target at a given range with a multi-
frequency signal of short duration. If successful, the 
combination of FDA-DM would have allowed 
unprecedented levels of wireless security, offering to 
securely transmit information to almost any wireless device 
without the need for traditional cryptographic encryption 
algorithms, avoiding problem of key distribution. 
Despite promising theoretical results, to the best of the 
authors’ knowledge, currently there is no experimental 
validation of the FDA-DM that demonstrates its alleged 
security in range domain – even for a simplified proof-of-
concept case. This mismatch between theoretical and 
experimental work decelerates further development of DM, 
as the combination of FDA with DM so far did not deliver 
on its promise of security without encryption. However, a 
brief observation was made in [18], [19] relating to the 
potential problem of time-invariance of FDA systems in the 
context of their radiation-pattern optimization.  
This paper provides the first in-depth analysis into the 
mechanisms of the FDA-DM security in range domain. It 
significantly extends the analyses provided in [5]–[17] in 
order to include a more generic approach with time as the 
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third missing variable. Proposed analysis demonstrates that 
the so-obtained security in range domain cannot be time-
invariant and that the “secure region” propagates with time. 
The provided results are generic for any currently known 
FDA-based security technique, regardless of the antenna 
structure and secrecy metric used. 
 
II. FREQUENCY DIVERSE ARRAY 
The concept of FDA was first introduced in [20], [21]. It 
employs array elements that radiate electromagnetic waves 
with slightly different frequencies, where the frequency 
differences are assumed to be many orders smaller than the 
reference carrier frequency. Fig. 1 illustrates a one-
dimensional (1D) uniformly spaced N-element FDA with a 
linear carrier frequency increment ∆f applied across the 
array. The first array element is taken as the reference with 
its excitation at the carrier frequency f0. Here ∆f << f0. 
 
d . . .
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f0+ f f0+(N–1 ∆f. . .
1 N2
r1 r2 rN
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Fig. 1.  Illustration of a 1D FDA with uniform frequency increment ∆f. 
 
It was presented in [20] and [21] that the ‘beamforming 
patterns’ are angle-range dependent. Two aspects need to 
be emphasized; 
1) The term ‘beamforming patterns’ used in [20] and [21] is 
not the same concept as the ‘far-field radiation patterns’ 
commonly used in the literature on antenna engineering, 
since the latter by definition refers to single frequency 
[22]. The ‘beamforming patterns’ can be instead 
interpreted as ‘normalized electric (or magnetic  field 
distribution in the far-field’; 
2) The ‘beamforming patterns’ are also a function of time. 
Since in [20] and [21] the radiated waveforms were 
designed to be very short pulses for radar applications, 
the time instant t associated with the detected electric 
field at a certain distance R is thus uniquely determined, 
i.e. t = R/c where c is the speed of light. In other words, 
the ‘beamforming patterns’ shown in [20] and [21] are 
not snap-shots at a certain time instant, but a series of 
snap-shots presented as a function of single parameter 
that combines time and range as t = R/c. This angle-range 
dependent ‘beamforming patterns’ of the pulsed FDA 
have been extensively investigated since then, resulting 
in a number of promising pulsed FDA radar systems, 
seen in [23]–[25] and references therein. However, 
contrary to radar applications, in order to establish a 
wireless communication link (the scope of the FDA 
systems studied in this paper), a continuous 
electromagnetic wave needs to be transmitted to carry 
information. Thus, the detected electric (or magnetic) 
field at each angle-range coordinate varies with time, i.e. 
‘beamforming patterns’ are functions of angle, range and 
time. 
 
In the meantime, another research effort on directional 
modulation (DM) was made in the antenna and propagation 
community. Most early DM works could only securely 
transfer narrow band signals. Therefore, the authors in [26] 
made the first effort in combining FDA with DM so that an 
OFDM modulated DM system was constructed. This work 
was recently extended to the time modulated arrays in [27]. 
Here, the FDA transmits signal waveforms continuously in 
time, different to the pulsed signals for FDA radar 
applications. No range-domain security was claimed in 
[26], [27]. 
Inspired by the FDA range-angle dependent 
beamforming patterns, and its first introduction to the DM 
systems, many recent research efforts have been focused on 
using the FDA concept to secure free space DM systems in 
range domain, e.g. [5]–[7], resulting so-called FDA-DM 
systems. However, an important factor was overlooked, 
since the FDA range-angle dependent beamforming 
patterns are also functions of time. This indicates that the 
secure reception regions (normally defined as the locations 
where the received bit error rates (BERs) are below a 
specified threshold) propagate in range as time elapses. 
This is analyzed in more detail in the subsequent section. 
 
III. DM AND FDA IN THEIR GENERAL FORMS 
In this section, we present mathematical modelling of both 
DM and FDA in their general forms, from which the 
previously reported FDA-DM fusion systems can be derived 
in Section III, leaving their discussions revealing the 
limitations in Section IV. 
A. DM 
For a 1D N-element transmit array, e.g. the one shown in 
Fig. 1 with ∆f being set to zero, the received far-field 
electric (or magnetic) field F can be expressed as 
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where H  = [H1, H2, …, HN] is the channel vector, and 
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‘[·]T’ refers to vector transpose operator. d is the uniform 
spacing between two consecutive array elements. r1 denotes 
the displacement between the first antenna (as the 
reference) and the far-field observation point. θ is the 
spatial direction with respect to the array, ranging from 0 to 
π defined in Fig. 1. In order to achieve DM functionality 
[2], in general form the array excitation vector G  is 
designed to be 
 
( )0p q
= +G DH W .                                (2) 
 
Here D is a complex number, representing a symbol (i.e. 
information modulated in IQ space) intended for 
transmission. Vector W is power normalized, i.e. †WW = 1, 
and it lies in the null space of channel vector ( )0H , i.e. 
( )0
T WH = 0. ‘[·]*’ and ‘[·]†’ denote conjugation and 
vector Hermitian transpose, respectively. θ0 is the desired 
secure communication direction. p and q determine the 
power allocation between useful information D and 
orthogonal artificial noise W . 
When inserting (2) into (1), we get 
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From (3), we can see that the information D (or associated 
modulation waveforms) are transferred to the legitimate 
user along θ = θ0, while for other directions the information 
D are contaminated with the randomly updated artificial 
noise W , greatly reducing probability of interception.  
 
B. FDA 
In this subsection, we mathematically describe how an 
FDA, shown in Fig. 1, operates. The radio frequency (RF) 
carrier frequency applied at each antenna element is 
 
 fn = f0 + (n–1 ·∆f.       n = 1, 2, …, N                  (4) 
 
For this uniformly spaced 1D FDA array, the received 
(pathloss being normalized out) far-field electric (or 
magnetic) field B along a spatial direction θ in free space 
can be written as 
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where An = Dvnexp(jφn) is the excitation of the nth array 
element, with scalar valued vn of amplitude and φn of phase 
in its initial state. Without loss of generality, vnexp(jφn) is 
set to be unity for each n. 
The phase term ϕn, seen in (5), can be further expressed 
as  
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The last term in the bracket in (6) is extremely tiny for 
practical FDA configurations. For example, when ∆f = 10 
kHz, f0 = 3 GHz, d = c/(2f0), and N = 10, this last phase 
term is less than 0.05º. This term is thus omitted hereafter. 
The phase difference with respect to the signal radiated by 
the first antenna is  
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The beamforming pattern B in (5) reaches its peaks when 
the phases of every summation terms are aligned. It 
requires ∆n to be 2knπ for each n. kn can be any arbitrary 
integers. Equivalently, 
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This shows how the beamforming pattern peaks change 
with angle θ, range r1, and time t. 
When (8) is satisfied, 
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which means the information D is delivered to the 
coordinate (θ, r1) at the time instant t, with a beamforming 
gain of 20log10(N) in dB. Since z can be any integer, there 
are infinite solutions to (8), meaning no wireless security 
can be achieved with FDA alone. 
 
IV. PREVIOUSLY REPORTED FDA-DM SYSTEMS 
When realizing FDAs can generate angle-range dependent 
beamforming patterns, plenty of efforts have been made to 
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incorporate FDA concept into DM transmitters [6]–[12], 
claiming that the information D can be securely delivered to 
a pre-specified angle-range coordinate, saying (θ0, R). The 
general form of the resulting FDA-DM systems reported in 
previous works is formulated in this section.  
Note: In Section V, the authors will point out that the 
resulting FDA-DM systems in their current forms fail to 
secure information in range domain as what the reported 
works have concluded. This is because they commonly 
adopted an assumption that is limited and overlooks the 
factor that FDA beamforming patterns at each spatial 
location are time-dependent. 
Combining FDA and DM, namely applying baseband 
DM excitation vector G  in (2) onto the frequency shifted 
RF carriers in (5), the electric (or magnetic) field in any far-
field location (θ, r1) becomes 
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Here Gn is the nth entry of the vector G . Replacing Gn in (2) 
into (10), we get 
 
( )
( )
( )
0 0
1
1 1
0
0
1
1 1
0
2 ( 1) cos cos
exp
exp 2 1 exp 2
2 ( 1) cos
exp
exp 2 1 exp 2
N
n
N
n
n
j f n d
p
c
r r
j n f t j f t
c c
j f n d
q
c
r r
j n f t j f t
c c
  
 
 
 
=
=
 − − 
=   
  
      
 −  −  −       
      
 − 
+   
 
      
 −  −  −       
      


E D
W
, 
(11) 
 
where Wn is the nth entry of the vector W . The same tiny 
phase as the last term in (6) is safely ignored here. 
The previously reported FDA-DM works [5]–[12] 
claimed that for a desired receiver’s located at (θ0, R) the 
information D can be uniquely conveyed to the desired 
receiver at (θ0, R) only. This is under assumption that the 
receiver samples signals at a reference time t = 0 when 
waveforms from all antennas converge at a desired distance 
R. For locations other than (θ0, R), the second summation in 
(11) is non-zero at t = 0, acting as orthogonal artificial noise 
in both angle and range domains. 
A simulation example of (11) is illustrated in Fig. 2 with 
FDA-DM system parameters listed in Table I. From Fig. 2, 
it can be seen that the QPSK modulated waveforms are 
only preserved in a pre-identified location (θ0 = 40º, R = 30 
km), achieving so-called secure wireless transmission in 
both angle and range domains. Two special cases are: a) 
when ∆f = 0, the second summation term in (11) is not a 
function of range (excluding the identical time harmonic 
term at f0 for every n), indicating no artificial noise is 
injected in range domain; b) when q = 0 (irrespective of the 
choice of ∆f), the second summation term in (11) is zero, 
indicating no artificial noise is injected in both angle and 
range domains. Readers can perform the simulations to 
verify the special cases if interested. The results are omitted 
here for brevity. The secure reception region can be further 
shrunk by increasing the number of antenna elements N 
and/or by allocating more power to artificial noise (i.e. 
increasing the ratio q/p), which are common strategies used 
in DM systems [2]. 
  
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
 
(c) 
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(d) 
Fig. 2.  Simulation example of previously reported FDA-DM system in its 
general form in (11). System parameters are listed in Table I. (a) 
Magnitudes and (b) phases of electric (or magnetic) fields in angle domain 
when r1 = R = 30 km; (c) Magnitudes and (d) phases of electric (or 
magnetic) fields in range domain when θ = θ0 = 40º (Pathloss is removed 
for illustration purpose). 
 
TABLE I 
SYSTEM PARAMETERS OF A PREVIOUSLY REPORTED FDA-DM EXAMPLE 
IN ITS GENERAL FORM IN (11) 
Parameter Value 
f0 3 GHz 
R 30 km 
θ0 40º 
∆f c/R = 10 kHz 
N 10 
d 0.5c/f0 = 5 cm 
p 0.5 
q 0.5 
t 0 
D Randomly generated QPSK symbols 
{exp(jπ/4); exp(j3π/4); exp(−jπ/4); exp(−j3π/4)} 
Number of simulated 
symbols 
40 
 
The above common proposition claimed in previous 
FDA-DM works will be discussed in the following section. 
 
V. SECURE RECEPTION REGIONS ‘PROPAGATE’ IN 
RANGE AS TIME ELAPSES IN FDA-DM SYSTEMS 
In this section, the authors point out that the constructed 
FDA-DM systems in their current forms, formulated in 
(11), cannot secure wireless transmissions in range domain. 
Our conclusion is reached because in our analysis the time t 
is treated in more comprehensive way.  
Referring to the example shown in Fig. 2, the previous 
FDA-DM works use far-field patterns in 2D angle-range 
domain at a selected time reference when the legitimate 
receiver samples detected signals, to claim the secure 
transmission in range domain. Thus, the patterns, such as 
those plotted in Fig. 2, are the field distributions at that 
chosen time instant. Two aspects that are associated with 
this time treatment are discussed as below; 
1) At the legitimate receiver end, in order to perform 
demodulation, the entire modulation symbol with a 
symbol period T is frequency down-converted first, 
before baseband sampling. Within this T, the term 
exp[j2π(n−1)∆f(t−r1/c)] in the second summation in (11) 
is not identical for each n, indicating the artificial noise 
cannot be perfectly cancelled out at the selected location 
(θ0, R). The amount of the remaining artificial noise for 
the legitimate receiver is determined by the system 
parameters, in particular N, ∆f, and T. This aspect has 
never been studied, while the second item discussed 
below is more critical, which reveals the limitation of the 
previously reported FDA-DM systems; 
2) The early FDA-DM works used the beamforming 
patterns at the selected time instant to calculate secure 
reception regions, claiming range-domain wireless 
security. However, the eavesdroppers do not necessarily 
sample the signals at the same time instant as the desired 
receiver does. Taking the same FDA-DM example with 
the settings in Table I (except time t), the simulated 
range-domain far-field patterns at the time instant t = (Re 
− R)/c = (36 km – 30 km)/c = 210−5 s are illustrated in 
 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Fig. 3.  Simulation example of previously reported FDA-DM system in its 
general form in (11). System parameters are listed in Table I (except time 
t). (a) Magnitudes and (b) phases of electric (or magnetic) fields in range 
domain when θ = θ0 = 40º and t = 210
−5 s (Pathloss is removed for 
illustration purpose). 
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Fig. 3. It is assumed that an eavesdropper receiver is 
positioned at (θe = θ0 = 40º, Re = 36 km). From Fig. 3, it 
can be clearly seen that the secure reception region (for 
this example it is the location where the well-formatted 
QPSK IQ constellations/waveforms are preserved) 
‘propagates’ at the speed of light, as time elapses. 
Similarly, when θe = θ0 and Re < R, the well-preserved 
signal waveforms pass the eavesdropper at the time 
instant (R − Re)/c ahead the time reference. To conclude, 
no secure transmissions in range domain can be achieved 
in free space by the previously reported FDA-DM 
systems in their current forms. 
 
Another intuitive explanation of why the FDA-DM 
systems cannot provide range-domain security is presented 
below with the help of Fig. 4: 
Assuming a legitimate receiver B positioned at (θ0, R) in 
free space detects electromagnetic waves which correspond 
to desired modulation symbols, these electromagnetic 
waves, spatially combined by each electromagnetic wave 
radiated from each transmit antenna, propagate at the speed 
of light along θ0, irrespective of their frequencies. 
Therefore, the same signal waveforms (subject to 
magnitude scaling) detected by the legitimate receiver reach 
every point along θ0 at different time instants when the far-
field condition is met. From this observation, it can be 
concluded that any FDA-DM arrangements, including their 
variants cannot provide secure wireless transmission in 
range domain in free space. 
 
 
Fig. 4.  Physical illustration of waveforms propagating along a spatial 
direction θ0.  
 
Next, we briefly list the limitations in some recent FDA-
DM literatures; 
• [5]–[12]: 
A time dependent phase term (i.e. αn shown in (7) in this 
paper) was missing in {(5) in [5]; (4) in [6]; (2) in [7]; (3) in 
[8]; (6) in [9]; (4) in [10]; (2) in [11]; (3) in [12]} and all 
the analyses thereafter. This indicates that an assumption t 
= 0 was made for every receiver in the field. It should be 
noted that the time in (4) in [6] and (2)-(3) in [11] is 
discussed only with respect to the dynamically changing 
excitation vector – not to the analysis of the propagating 
signals. In other words, the authors in these works assume 
legitimate and eavesdropping receivers sampling signals at 
the same instant, leading to incomplete conclusions;  
• [13]: 
The authors used the same time instant to sample the 
received signals at both legitimate and eavesdropping 
receivers, see (11) and (12) in [13]; 
• [14]: 
From (10) in [14], the author claimed that the radiation 
energy is focused at (θin, R). Mathematically, this can only 
be obtained when t = 0. In fact, when t varies, it can be seen 
that this focusing point propagates at the speed of light in 
range domain; 
• [15]–[17]: 
In {(9) in [15]; (4) in [16]; (6) in [17]}, the time ‘t’ in the 
denominator is the time reference the authors selected 
(when the legitimate receiver samples signals), while the 
time ‘t’ in the numerator should be the time instant when 
each receiver samples their detected signals. These two 
time ‘t’ are not necessarily identical. In fact, when different 
‘t’ in numerator is chosen, it can be observed that the 
spatial focusing region propagates; 
• [28]: 
In fact, the Fig. 2 in [28] and the associated discussions 
clearly shown that the secure reception region propagates at 
the speed of light in range domain. However, the authors 
claimed that if the array excitation vector changes 
accordingly, the secure region does not propagate. This 
statement cannot hold, as the continuously altered array 
radiation at the transmitter end cannot instantly propagates 
through space. When the propagation delay is considered, it 
can be observed that the secure reception region propagates 
regardless if the excitation vector changes or not. 
• [29]–[31]: 
From the {secrecy capacity definition in (21) to (23) in 
[29]; secrecy rate definition in (42) to (46) in [30]; secrecy 
rate definition in (60) to (65) in [31]}, it is realized that the 
authors assumed that legitimate and eavesdropping 
receivers sample the signals at the same time instant. 
 
Based on the above analyses, the conclusions reached in 
some previous FDA-DM works [5]–[17], [28]–[31] are 
incomplete and the assumption on receivers’ sampling time 
instant needs to be carefully examined. It is also worth 
noting that some works on FDA beampattern synthesis 
suffer a similar limitation [32]–[34], i.e. the dot-shaped 
pattern peaks in angle-range domain propagate in range as 
time elapses. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The realization of DM scheme that allows security with 
respect to both direction and range domains is a significant 
research problem, with potentially high impact if solved. 
However, the paper demonstrated that such security cannot 
be obtained in free-space by simple combination of DM and 
FDA when the time variable is incorporated in the 
investigated model. It has been demonstrated that the 
‘secure area’ will propagate in range – similarly to any 
other electromagnetic signal – and consequently any 
eavesdropper located along the pre-defined direction is able 
to easily intercept the signal within limited time. 
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